

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 3, 2014

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Fox, D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 3, 2014

**Tank Farms.** The contractor declared a TSR violation of the specific administrative control for double valve isolation (DVI) due to manipulation of valves credited for DVI between the 242-A evaporator and waste tanks. The TSR applies when there is waste in the evaporator vessel. The procedure used to perform tank farm valve operation requires confirmation that valve operation will not compromise required DVI, and the transfer procedure identifies the credited valves. The contractor conducted a fact finding meeting and is evaluating the results to determine what actions are required to prevent recurrence. The contractor restricted all waste transfers without a management review until long term corrective actions are implemented.

Two safety-significant valves that were being used for DVI to support the evaporator run were taken out of service due to findings of a vendor quality assurance audit.

**242-A Evaporator.** The contractor again entered the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) for the flammable gas control system (see Activity Report 9/19/2014) when two safety interlocks were inadvertently tripped by a worker who manipulated two switches in the safety instrumented system cabinet without authorization. The evaporator entered shutdown mode and exited the LCO. The evaporator resumed operations briefly then entered a controlled shutdown due to waste transfer restrictions in the tank farms (see above).

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP).** The phased commissioning approach for WTP requires aggressive management to confirm adequate readiness to safely process waste at the Low Activity Waste facility while completing the High Level Waste and Pretreatment facilities. The site reps met with ORP and contractor representatives to discuss the processes and methods that will be used to establish readiness. The contractor has developed a support plan for this effort. Under the plan, contractor line management is responsible for establishing readiness per defined requirements. The results will be evaluated by an independent readiness group. Interface readiness requirements and issues will be managed by the One System organization with their results also evaluated by the independent group.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant.** The contractor concluded that the lightweight concrete they were testing will not be used for size-reducing gloveboxes because the concrete did not adhere to the fixative used to stabilize the material at risk (see Activity Report 8/15/2014). However, they are still considering it for other purposes, such as filling pipes and ducts. The current plan for dealing with gloveboxes with significant residual holdup is for workers to size reduce them inside the facility. These workers will likely wear the same PPE used by personnel working in Building 242-Z (see Activity Report 9/12/2014).

**Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility.** A structural engineer performed a visual inspection of the canyon interior and his initial conclusion was the condition was acceptable.

**Management Changes.** J. Fulton retired as President of the Central Plateau Contractor and has been replaced by J. Ciucci.